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Propulsion systems for small-satellites are approaching the market. At the same time, some operators do not encrypt 
their communications links, creating the near-term potential for an unauthorized actor to send spurious commands to 
a satellite. At worst, an unauthorized activation of the propulsion system could precipitate a conjunction. Aside from 
the potential loss of system hardware, the reputational costs to the industry of such an incident could be significant 
and far-reaching. To establish a physical basis for the feasibility of this risk, we simulate the potential altitude increase 
from a 300 km circular orbit generated for a 10 kg nano-satellite coupled with each of the propulsion system types 
under advanced development. We find that chemical reaction systems enable the satellite to access all altitudes within 
LEO over short time domains and that electrostatic propulsion is capable of reaching GEO, though over long time 
domains. Manufacturers, launch service providers and brokers, regulators, and the CubeSat community all have 
potential roles to play in managing this risk. 
OVERVIEW 
Small-satellites, particularly those meeting the CubeSat 
design specification, historically have not featured 
propulsion systems. Though some operators have used 
techniques such as differential drag to manage position, 
particularly for constellations, propulsion would enable 
a range of more sophisticated missions. A small-satellite 
with a propulsion system could perform the following: 
• Dispersal maneuver to scatter away from a primary 
payload 
• Constellation deployment and formation flight 
• Low-Earth orbit changes and corrections (altitude or 
inclination) 
• Low-Earth orbit life extension by drag 
compensation 
• Maneuvers with delta-V greater than Earth’s escape 
velocity for interplanetary missions 
• End-of-mission deorbiting 
A number of efforts to realize small-satellite propulsion 
are in the advanced R&D or production stages, as further 
described below. However, alongside the benefits that 
propulsion would provide to smallsat mission designers 
and operators, this emergent technology may yield new 
risks. 
In particular, some smallsat operators do not encrypt 
their telemetry, tracking, and control (TTC) or mission 
data communication links. Though systematic data does 
not exist on the encryption status of small-satellite 
mission communication links, informal conversations 
within the smallsat community and economic self-
interest suggest that university missions are the primary 
users of unencrypted links.  
The combination of a propulsion system and 
unencrypted TTC links raises the possibility of an 
unauthorized actor sending spurious commands to a 
satellite. At worst, an unauthorized activation of the 
propulsion system could precipitate a conjunction. Aside 
from the potential loss of system hardware, the 
reputational costs to the industry of such an incident 
could be significant and far-reaching. 
In this paper, we identify the capabilities of small-sat 
propulsion systems that may be deployed in the near 
term, which we define to mean Technology Readiness 
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Level (TRL) 6 or higher. We couple these propulsion 
systems to a reference nano-satellite and simulate the 
orbital altitude change possible to set an outer physical 
limit on the orbital regimes potentially held at risk by an 
aberrant small-satellite. 
The goal of this analysis is to identify whether the 
combination of unencrypted TTC communications and 
propulsion systems under development could—in 
principle—pose a meaningful threat to high-value 
spaceborne assets, such as commercial, military, and 
scientific satellites or human spaceflight. Further, should 
our analysis show that a meaningful risk does not 
currently exist, the results will define a checkpoint for 
further investigation. The eventual development of more 
powerful smallsat propulsion systems may necessitate a 
re-evaluation. Lastly, regardless of the likelihood of a 
conjunction, there remains the threat to the operator of 
losing the value of their asset if an unauthorized 
command leads to the activation of the propulsion 
system. This could result in the satellite relocating to an 
orbit that limits its operation usefulness, the system’s 
lifetime, or the rapid deorbit of the satellite.  
The authors fully acknowledge the limits of our analysis; 
the scenario under consideration includes numerous 
simplifying assumptions. However, this worst-case, 
zero-order analysis is an appropriate first step because it 
represents an absolute limit on possibility. If a propulsive 
satellite does not have sufficient energy to cross the orbit 
of another high-value asset, no further discussion about 
the feasibility or likelihood of the threat is worthwhile. 
We welcome further discussion with all stakeholders 
about our analysis and its implications for particular 
missions. 
RISK BASIS 
Use of Small-Satellites 
Smallsats are considered the next generation of 
spacecraft, as the incentive for designing, building, and 
launching more compact payloads has grown 
exponentially in the past two decades. They can be 
classified by volume or mass, with the latter being the 
most practical to determine launch and propulsion 
requirements. Although no official nomenclature apart 
from the “CubeSat” standard introduced in 1999 exists, 
the following classification is commonly adopted by the 
scientific and engineering community, and will be used 
in this paper: 
• A small-satellite has a mass below 500 kg 
• A micro-satellite has a mass between 10 and 100 kg 
• A nano-satellite has a mass between 1 and 10 kg 
• A pico-satellite has a mass between 0.1 and 1 kg 
• A femto-satellite has a mass below 0.1 kg 
The CubeSat standard was defined by California 
Polytechnic State University and Stanford University, 
and has been adopted by educational institutions, 
government agencies, and private industries all around 
the world. Each unit, also referred to as a “U”, has a tight 
volumetric constraint (a cube with 10 cm-long edges), 
and a maximum mass of 1.33 kg (although exceptions 
exist). Combinations of these units can be made to form 
n-U satellites, with n typically between 1.5 and 6. 
Reference 4 offers an extensive survey of worldwide 
pico- and nano-satellite missions before 2009. Figure 1 
and Figure 2 illustrate the past and projected number of 
launches per year. A small number of satellites under 10 
kg were launched before 1962, since the payload 
requirements were limited by the launch capabilities in 
the early years of space-flight. As the space-race led to a 
rapid increase of payload mass limits, larger satellites 
were favored to house more advanced instrumentation 
and communication devices. However, technological 
progress in the miniaturization of electronic components 
made it possible to conceive smaller systems, still 
capable of providing significant contributions. 
 
Figure 1: Pico- and Nano-satellites Launched 
between 1957 and 20094 
 
Figure 2: Nano-satellites Launched between 1998 and 
2023 (projected)5 
First designed for educational purposes, small-satellites 
became low-cost, low-risk, and rapid solutions for space-
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exploration, technology demonstration, and commerce at 
the end of the 20th century. Large constellations for 
communications such as Orbcomm and GlobalStar 
(1998) were deployed, and CubeSats were popular for 
training purposes. Between 2012 and 2013, the number 
of attempted launches of nano-satellites increased by 
330%, and one industry analysis projects there will be 
between 2,000 and 2,750 launches of satellites under 50 
kg between 2014 and 20206. With the personal 
electronics industry driving down the cost, mass, and 
size of microelectronics while simultaneously improving 
their performance, small-satellites are now an affordable 
pursuit for start-up companies around the world, funded 
with more venture capital every year. Advances in 
additive manufacturing technology have also 
significantly changed the design capabilities and 
development costs of pico- and nano-satellites (typically 
ranging between $100,000 and $2 million), mitigating 
the financial consequences of potential launch failures. 
There is a significant interest in small-satellite missions 
because of the capabilities these low-mass systems can 
now offer. The lower cost of development and access to 
space is expected to lead commercial funding to exceed 
government- or university-sponsored missions after 
2018. Most of these satellites will be used for Earth 
observation and remote-sensing, including applications 
for natural disaster prevention and monitoring, 
environmental pollution, resource monitoring, and 
agricultural optimization. Another application is 
technology demonstration in areas like thermal 
protection, avionics or instrumentation. Finally, 
operational use of small-satellites, for communications, 
scientific measurements, and space exploration cover 
most of the remaining mission concepts. However, these 
satellites are typically confined to their dispersal orbits, 
and although an increasing number of launch 
opportunities exist, most are dependent on the primary 
payload’s delivery orbit, which adds significant 
constraints to the mission planning. Government 
agencies such as NASA, ESA, and JAXA offer rides as 
secondary payloads to LEO, known as “ride-sharing” or 
“piggy-backing”, but private companies such as Rocket 
Lab and Vector Space Systems are now designing 
dedicated launchers to meet the specific needs of 
payloads under 500 kg7. The European Union is also 
identifying competitive solutions to answer the demand 
within the Horizon 2020 program8. Figure 3 shows the 
cumulative number of nano-satellites designed by type, 
illustrating the popularity of 3 and 6U CubeSats. 
 
Figure 3: Cumulative Nano-satellite Designs by 
Type5 
According to the Union of Concerned Scientists’ 
database9 (updated 8/31/2017), 1,738 satellites are active 
in Earth orbit, with 6.6% having an unreported launch 
mass, 42% a mass under 500 kg, and 20% classified as 
nano-satellites or smaller. However, the nano-satellite 
database by Erik5 estimates that there are almost 600 
nano-satellites in orbit. Among the reported active 
satellites under 10 kg, almost all are in low-Earth, near-
circular orbits, with altitudes roughly ranging between 
300 and 900 km, and inclinations between 0 and 120°. It 
is interesting to note that 70% of these satellites are in a 
sun-synchronous orbit, largely due to the heavy presence 
of Planet’s Earth-imaging CubeSats. With almost 200 
Earth-imaging satellites in operation, the company 
currently controls the largest fleet. 
Satellite Encryption 
One area of increasing interest has been the use of 
encryption on small-satellites. We focus our analysis on 
satellites potentially subject to U.S. regulations, though 
the analysis could be extended to other jurisdictions, 
drawing frequently from a recent analysis by the 
Aerospace Corporation regarding small-satellite policy 
compliance. 
Satellites “owned or controlled” by the U.S. Department 
of Defense must have encrypted up- and down-links, as 
mandated by DoD Instruction 8581.01.13 For U.S. 
federal spacecraft outside of DoD, a NIST framework 
determines whether encryption is required based on the 
“criticality and sensitivity of information transmitted.”13  
The revised Cybersecurity Policy for Space Systems 
Used to Support National Security Missions (CNSSP-12, 
Feb. 2018) includes flow-down requirements to most 
commercial operators of systems leased by or otherwise 
supporting DoD regarding the encryption of 
communication links.10 
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Finally, DoD or other federal agency sponsorship of an 
academic satellite may create flow-down requirements 
for encrypted links. Further, for those satellites subject 
to NOAA’s Commercial Remote Sensing Policy, the 
regulator must approve a licensee’s Data Protection Plan, 
which must include information on link protection.14 
This policy patchwork results in a class of academic and 
commercial operators not subject to a government-
imposed encryption requirement, with the Aerospace 
Corporation noting that there is “no current requirement 
to encrypt up-links, regardless of satellite capability for 
propulsion, proximity ops, etc.”13 That said, to the extent 
commercial operators are not bound by governmental 
regulators, there remains a commercial interest in 
encryption. The data sensed by for-profit operators is an 
essential ingredient in its product offering(s). Preventing 
its misappropriation by customers or competitors is a 
rational defensive move. Indeed, at least one NewSpace 
commercial imaging operator publicly acknowledges 
encrypting its data down-links.11 
Furthermore, commercial operators’ frequent use of 
constellations amortizes the fixed costs of encryption 
implementation among many units. Commercially-
available cryptographic chips under development for 
small-satellite use are on the scale of tens of thousands 
of dollars. Price breaks for bulk encryption chip 
purchases and being able to apply the system design to 
multiple satellites eases the pain of encryption for 
commercial operators and is not analogous to the low-
budget, one-off satellite context of a university team.  
For university teams not bound by U.S. government or 
other governments’ encryption requirements, there is no 
similar private interest in protecting mission data. 
Instead, as a cultural value within the scientific 
community, data is meant to be shared. Though there is 
certainly a self-interest in securing TTC links against the 
possibility of someone interrupting the mission, such a 
consideration, particularly once costs are considered, 
does not appear to hold the same salience as for 
commercial operators. 
Small-satellite Propulsion Development 
In this paper, only propulsion systems using high-
velocity propellant ejection are considered15,16,17,18,19. 
The energy to produce thrust is therefore delivered by 
stored enthalpy, chemical combustion or electric 
sources, and used to accelerate matter. Different 
parameters are used to categorize these propulsion 
systems and determine mission requirements: 
The total impulse [N.s] is the thrust force integrated over 
the run time. This parameter can only be used to compare 
propulsion systems if it is assumed that they carry the 
same mass of propellant. Attitude control systems 
requiring fine pointing also use the term minimum 
impulse bit (MIB), which is the smallest repeatable 
impulse delivered by a thruster. 
The specific impulse (Isp [s]) is the total impulse per unit 
weight of propellant, or for constant values, thrust per 
unit mass. In general, the higher the specific impulse, the 
less propellant required, which can translate as a measure 
of performance. However, caution is to be used since Isp 
alone does not give an indication of the thrust level. Low 
mass flow systems can exhibit very high specific 
impulse, but also very low delivered thrust. Care should 
also be taken when specifying Isp at sea level or in 
vacuum. In this paper, only vacuum Isp values are 
considered since the evaluated systems are designed for 
in-space use.  
The ideal theoretical velocity change “Delta-v” (Δv 
[m/s]) derived from the Tsiolkovsky rocket equation, is 
a function of the mass loss during powered flight. It is 
used to describe the propulsive requirements of a 
maneuver, ranging from m/s for low-Earth orbit drag 
compensation, to km/s to move within the Earth-Moon 
system. Δv capability of a propulsion system is specified 
for a given spacecraft total mass. 
The propulsion dry mass fraction is a measure of the 
ratio between the propellant mass expended to deliver 
the thrust, and the remaining structural mass. It is 
obtained by dividing the “dry” mass by the total mass of 
the propulsion unit (including the propellant or “wet” 
mass). Unfortunately, this value is rarely specified by 
manufacturers, and does not scale linearly with 
propellant loading. This value typically decreases as 
propulsion systems scale upward.  
Chemical propulsion 
Chemical propulsion utilizes the enthalpy stored in the 
propellant itself: the system’s internal energy plus the 
product of pressure and volume. When the energy from 
a chemical combustion reaction is released, the products 
are heated to high temperatures, and kinetic energy is 
harnessed through supersonic expansion in the nozzle. 
Chemical systems can achieve high thrust, making them 
the most suitable candidates for launch vehicles. But 
downsizing chemical propulsion systems for in-space, 
small-satellite applications can be difficult due to the 
complexity of miniaturized active propellant handling 
components (valves, pumps, pressure vessels, etc.) rated 
to high pressures. The associated dry mass and volume 
can become significant, producing either insufficient Δv 
or in certain cases exceeding the system’s design 
constraints. Despite these engineering challenges, 
advanced-development chemical propulsion systems 
are: 
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Cold gas: uses a compressed gas - such as helium, 
nitrogen, or liquid isobutane (self-pressurized) - 
delivering relatively low specific impulses (40 to 120s). 
Their inherent simplicity makes them well-suited for 
reaction control systems (RCS), with MIBs around 
1mN.s, and low-thrust small-satellite maneuvers.  
Warm gas: the internal energy of the stored gas is 
increased through heating with an external electrical 
source, which improves the delivered specific impulse. 
Water electrolysis: Electrolyzers in a water tank 
decompose the propellant into a mixture of oxygen and 
hydrogen gas, which is then injected and ignited in a 
combustion chamber. Isp values are around 300 s, and 
the inherent safety of a water-based propulsion system is 
attractive for CubeSat developers. 
Monopropellant: utilizes thermal or catalytic 
decomposition, producing a highly exothermic reaction. 
Hydrazine and monomethylhydrazine (MMH) are the 
most commonly used monopropellants, despite their 
toxicity and strict handling requirements. This increases 
the associated cost and prohibits development in 
academic settings. Research efforts now focus on 
“green” monopropellant solutions, such as AF-M315E 
developed by Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). 
Controllability, restart, and a specific impulse range 
between 150 and 250 s makes them ideal for a variety of 
small-satellite operations.  
Liquid bi-propellant: depends on the chemical reaction 
of an oxidizer and a fuel stored separately. These systems 
deliver the highest specific impulses (can be up to 450 s, 
but typically below 300 s), but at a cost of greater 
complexity associated with independent fluid handling 
systems. The total mass and volume of a full bi-
propellant unit often exceed nano-satellite constraints.      
Solid: these systems offer the highest thrust-to-weight 
ratio by storing both the oxidizer and fuel in the densest, 
pre-mixed state. Their lack of throttle-ability or restart 
capability makes them better suited for single de-orbiting 
maneuvers, with Isp values between 200 and 300 s.   
Hybrid: although not space-flight qualified, hybrid 
systems offer a promising alternative to bi-liquid or solid 
thrusters. They exhibit higher specific impulse than 
monopropellants, reduce system complexity compared 
to bi-liquid systems, and increase controllability 
compared to solid motors. They have been identified as 
possible candidates for small-satellite interplanetary 
missions requiring significant Δv.25 
Electric propulsion 
Electric propulsion (EP) has been used extensively on 
spacecrafts since the 1960s, but recent interest in small-
satellites has boosted research and development in 
electric micropropulsion. Although EP units can be 
simpler and more compact than their chemical 
counterparts, research efforts have been focused on 
decreasing their considerable power requirements. EP 
systems use electrical power to heat or directly accelerate 
a propellant. The external energy source can be provided 
by chemical, nuclear, or solar sources, and deployable 
solar panel area typically limits the power budget of 
nano- and pico-satellites below 30 W. Mars Cube One 
(MarCO), the 13.5 kg, 6U interplanetary CubeSats 
launched in May 2018, can generate up to 35 W near 
Earth and 17 W near Mars with two square-foot solar 
arrays26. There are three main categories of EP systems: 
Electrothermal: electric energy is used to heat the 
propellant and increase its enthalpy before expanding it 
through a nozzle. This is in effect similar to warm-gas 
propulsion, but technically differs because only the flow 
of propellant is heated to high temperatures before the 
nozzle throat, compared to the bulk gas in a storage tank 
or a separate reservoir. These two types can be merged 
for simplicity. Resistojets generate heat with high 
electrical resistance that is transferred to the working 
fluid primarily through convection.  
Electrostatic: uses electric fields to accelerate charged 
particles. Ion thrusters (including radio-frequency), Hall 
thrusters, Colloid-electrospray thrusters, and field 
emission electrostatic propulsion (FEEP) are all types of 
electrostatic systems. The low mass of the non-neutral 
particles (mostly ions) leads to low thrust levels but high 
specific impulse. The power requirements of Hall 
thrusters still exceed small-satellite capabilities (over 
100 W) and are not considered here.  
Electromagnetic: uses electromagnetic fields to 
accelerate gas heated to a plasma state. The most 
common types of thrusters are magneto-plasma-dynamic 
(MPD), pulsed-plasma (PPT), and vacuum arc thrusters 
(VAT). Minimum impulse bit values are specified for 
systems designed to operate in pulsed mode, and MPD 
systems still require power levels beyond those 
achievable on small-satellites. 
As a result of this analysis, propulsion systems for 
satellites weighing less than 10 kg, and at a TRL of 6 or 
higher will be divided in the categories presented in 
Table 1. Thrust ranges are approximate for nano- and 
pico-satellites, since they depend on the scale of the 
propulsion system and the throttling capabilities. The dry 
mass ratio range has also been roughly approximated 
given the scarcity of data for fully integrated propulsion 
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units for satellites of this scale. Most developed concepts 
(monopropellant, electrostatic) specify the thruster mass, 
but the propellant storage system can be customized to 
specific mission requirements. 






Isp [s] Dry mass 
ratio 
TRL  
Cold gas 0.1 – 102 40 – 80 0.5 – 0.95 9 
Chemical 
reaction 
1 – 104 150 – 300 0.4 – 0.8 6 – 8 
Warm gas/ 
electrothermal 
1 – 50 70 – 300 0.4 – 0.85 6 – 9 
Electrostatic 0.01 – 10 800 – 5000 0.5 – 0.9 6 – 9 
Electromagnetic 10-5 – 1 500 – 2000 0.8 – 0.99 6 – 9 
 
SCENARIO DESIGNa 
Distinctions from Anti-satellite Attacks 
An Anti-Satellite (ASAT) attack is any course of 
external action that may cause temporary and reversible 
interference or permanent damage on a spacecraft, a 
ground station, or the links between them1. Space-based 
kinetic energy weapons, also known as Kinetic Kill 
Vehicles (KKVs) or co-orbital kinetic kill ASATs, are 
kamikaze spacecraft designed to destroy orbiting targets 
on contact using the large amount of kinetic energy that 
orbiting spacecraft have. No warheads or explosives are 
needed. Satellites in orbit move along predictable 
trajectories at high speeds. Furthermore, being nearly 
impossible to hide, satellites are highly valuable assets 
that are difficult to protect. At such large speeds, 
collisions with even very small objects can be 
disastrous1.  
The risk posed by the unauthorized access of a 
propulsive small-sat shares features with that posed by 
kinetic ASATs. At worst, a propulsive small-sat as 
becomes a kinetic kill vehicle. As Galton2 states, "A 
large percentage of space assets can be considered dual 
use in that they have distinct value to the military, 
civilian, and scientific sectors of society but 
simultaneously pose a threat to the space security 
environment." 
However, we recognize that purpose-built weapons 
incorporate essential design features almost certainly not 
present in foreseeable nano-satellites. From an orbital 
                                                           
a The Python code described here and reported below may be requested 
by contacting the authors at their corresponding email addresses. 
mechanics perspective, intercepting a spacecraft using a 
KKV at LEO is one of the hardest maneuvers ever 
performed, "the equivalent of hitting a bullet with a 
bullet.”3 Even though a satellite orbit is predictable and 
may be known well ahead the interception, the exact 
position of the target has a large uncertainty. In fact, a 
KKV needs to steer itself to hit the target at high speed 
and high acceleration.3 Thus, military KKVs have some 
kind of seeker, guidance, and closed-loop control to 
track, follow, and finally destroy the target. Without any 
such a tracking system, purposefully hitting a target at 
LEO is improbable, but still possible. In other words, a 
misappropriated satellite without any kind of tracking 
system can only perform open-loop mid-course 
correction maneuvers. 
Simulated Scenario 
Our reference nano-satellite begins parked in an 
equatorial circular orbit at an altitude of 300 km. The 
propulsion system is turned on until the propellant mass 
is completely depleted. The thrusting direction is 
assumed to be along track. Although this is not exactly 
the direction that maximizes the final altitude, it can be 
shown that the optimal thrusting vector oscillates around 
this direction29,30. We assume the satellite meets the 25-
year guideline for debris mitigation, meaning it orbits 
below 700 km to self-clean or has a propulsion system 
for deorbit, implying that a retrograde burn would simply 
hasten existing deorbit plans.27 
Since the major secular changes in semimajor axis and 
eccentricity in LEO are due to drag, the perturbation 
caused is added to the simulation with a very simple 
exponential model with atmosphere density varying with 
altitude (See Table 8-4 in Ref. 27). The spacecraft's side 
facing the drag force is assumed to be 200 cm2 (two 
CubeSat units) and the drag coefficient is taken as 2.1. 
Even though thrusting for long periods is not possible for 
several propulsion systems due to thermal or power 
considerations, the analysis establishes a physical outer 
bound and gives the minimum time of flight that a 
spacecraft with a particular propulsion system may take 
to reach an orbit of a certain altitude.  
We note that changing inclination or RAAN (Right 
Ascension of Ascending Node) is not necessary here. 
Major RAAN and inclination changes are expensive, 
especially in LEO. In fact, even in the same orbital plane, 
an attacker can wait for natural phenomena to perform 
the needed RAAN change. For example, the J2 
component of the Earth gravity field differentially 
rotates the orbital planes by a RAAN secular change for 
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different altitudes and inclinations27. Once a RAAN 
change is obtained, inclination changes are unnecessary 
with a conjunction still possible. In fact, relative linear 
momentum would be an essential element of an attack 
profile. 
Therefore, in order to get a first order estimate of the 
sphere of influence an attacker could reach for our 
reference designs, it is only necessary to consider in-
plane maneuvers. In other words, an attacker could get 
to higher orbits by performing in-plane instead of out-of-
plane changes.  
In the simulation performed, the misappropriated 
smallsat is assumed to weigh 10 kg (largest of the nano-
satellite class) with 50% of the total mass allocated to the 
propulsion system, the remainder being the functional 
payload. Five propulsion systems in development are 
selected from the categories in Table 2, and the 
performance metrics are assumed to remain constant as 
the units are scaled up to a total mass of 5 kg. The 
respective average thrusts, Isps, and dry mass ratios are 
used to estimate the total mass of propellant, average 
mass flow rate, and consequently satellite mass and 
acceleration varying with burn time.  
Table 2: Existing Propulsion Systems Selected for 
Orbit-Raising Simulation 







Microspace20 POPSAT/HIP1 0.2 31.8 0.78 
ECAPS21 1N-HPGP 1000 235 0.43 
Busek22 Micro 
Resistojet 
10 150 0.87 
Busek23 BIT-3 1.24 2300 0.48 
NASA/Primex 
Aerospace24 
EO-1 0.86 1400 0.86 
 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
The following figures show the altitude the reference 
propulsive nanosat systems can reach versus time of 
flight for the maneuver. The quantitative results are 
summarized in Table 3. Most systems can soar to higher 
altitudes remaining in LEO. Only orbits up to GEO were 
considered in the model, but with electrostatic 
propulsion, a smallsat could reach MEO, GEO, and 
potentially even higher orbits. High thrust, low Isp 
systems (chemical reaction) can quickly reach targets in 
LEO (< 2 h), but low thrust, high Isp capabilities enable 
smallsats to reach much higher altitudes but require very 
long flight times (over 390 days to GEO for the 
electrostatic propulsion system considered in the 
analysis).  
 
Figure 4: Altitude vs. Time from Epoch for a 10 kg 
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Table 3: Orbit-raising Simulation Results with 
Selected Propulsion Systems 
Propulsion Type Maximum 
altitude [km] 
Time of flight 
[h (days)] 
Cold gas 360 480 (20) 





(max limit at GEO) 
9400 (392) 
Electromagnetic 2420 3100 (129) 
 
DISCUSSION 
Chemical reaction propulsion systems may pose a 
credible risk to other objects in LEO, which, as shown in 
Table 4, is the most populous region of space. 
Table 4: Number of Satellites in Circular Orbits, 
Per Orbital Regimeb 
Orbital Regime Number of Satellites (all masses) 
LEO (<2,000 km) 1,072 
MEO (2,000-~35,000 km) 94 
GEO (~35,000 km) 529 
Stakeholders should consider whether it would be 
feasible to react to an unwarned maneuver prior to a 
conjunction. 
Though other propulsion systems, particularly 
electrostatics, indicate an ability to potentially hold 
additional high-value orbital regimes at risk, the time of 
flight and coexistent likelihood of detection likely make 
such an attack unattractive.  
As noted above, the goal of this analysis is strictly to 
establish physical plausibility. Simply because 
kinematics suggests that a particular propulsive system 
can reach a certain altitude does not mean a successful 
attack is probable. In order to launch an attack on an 
orbiting spacecraft without any closed-loop tracking 
capabilities, the attacker must accurately know the 
position and velocity of the target and the interceptor at 
a certain epoch and propagate both orbits with a very 
accurate orbit propagator. Orbit prediction is usually 
                                                           
b We classify here objects in circular orbits as those with eccentricities 
less than 0.1. Data via Union of Concerned Scientists, ref. 9. 
hard, especially for a spacecraft in LEO, where drag is 
the most important perturbation. Drag is a hard-to-
predict phenomenon that presents unpredictable hourly 
variations.  
 In order to perform mid-course corrections, the attacker 
may need ongoing communication with the satellite. The 
intruder would thus need a worldwide, or at least an 
extensive, network of ground stations available. 
Additionally, it is probable that the satellite would have 
to perform an attitude maneuver in order to communicate 
with a ground station, which means that thrusting and 
communicating at the same time might not be possible. 
Finally, the tight power budgets found on many nano-
satellites could make a successful intrusion challenging 
because the attacker may not know that capabilities or 
sensitivities of the system.  
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Any satellite, including a small-satellite, with a 
significant propulsive capability should secure its TTC 
links against unauthorized access.  
Though the likelihood of success by an attacker and the 
probability of collision may be low, the reputational risk 
to the small-satellite community even without a resulting 
conjunction may be significant. Given the increasing 
prominence of this sector within the space industry and 
governments’ increasing emphasis on space investment, 
an aberrant event may lead to calls for restrictive 
regulations that would slow the maturation and 
acceptance of small-satellite technology.   
Space Policy Directive-3 defines a framework for future 
U.S. policymaking on space traffic management. The 
document envisions a future pre-launch certification 
process that includes “consideration” of a minimum set 
of factors, of specific relevance “encryption of satellite 
command and control links.”35 However, at best such 
requirements—likely years from implementation— 
would apply only to those missions with a U.S. nexus 
(operator, launch provider, etc.).10 Since space represents 
a global commons, shared norms are necessary.  
To generate global coverage, as well as to take advantage 
of an opportunity to cooperatively design a U.S. policy 
that will eventually become federal regulation, we offer 
several approaches that smallsat community 
stakeholders could consider in formulating a response to 
the risk demonstrated above. 
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Propulsion Module Manufacturers 
As product originators, propulsion module 
manufacturers know the customer base best. Further, 
their incentive to protect their products’ viability by 
ensuring appropriate regulations is strong, creating a 
clear logic for manufacturers to make encryption a 
standard sales term. Elegantly, unlike national 
regulation, a step taken by the module manufacturer 
would apply to satellite customers regardless of 
nationality. 
Similar to export compliance, module manufacturers 
may need to take steps to “know your customer” and 
ensure that the recipient of the module is truly capable of 
integrating protected communications channels. Though 
there are certainly costs involved in this effort, they may 
be low relative to the risks of not requiring protection. 
To avoid customers shopping for the least restrictive 
terms, module manufacturers worldwide could consider 
creating a cooperative mechanism to facilitate a standard 
policy. Self-regulation of this sort is common across 
industries and is often effective when companies are 
better placed than governments to address a market 
externality. Cooperative mechanisms need not be 
elaborate, and clear terms of reference defining how such 
an agreement would operate could allay anticompetitive 
concerns.  
Launch Service Providers and Brokers 
Launch service providers and brokers represent a second 
potential chokepoint for protection: nothing gets to orbit 
without them. As a matter or corporate citizenship and 
sustainability, these entities could consider backstopping 
a propulsion module manufacturer self-regulatory 
mechanism or developing their own policy of encryption 
as a precondition of accepting a propulsive payload. As 
with the module manufacturers, engaging launch service 
providers sidesteps intergovernmental negotiations and 
captures any nation’s operators seeking to launch with 
that platform. 
Since university missions appear to be the least likely to 
secure their communications links, the brokers that often 
play a pivotal matching role between customers and 
launch service providers could also establish corporate 
policies of requiring encryption as a condition of the 
transaction. Brokers are well-positioned to advise their 
clients on the latest norms and trends. 
Regulators 
If industry fails to act, governments worldwide could 
consider coordinated efforts through multilateral export 
control mechanisms such as the Wassenaar Arrangement 
and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Regulators 
could seek to establish a norm of encrypted TTC links as 
a license condition when exporting propulsion systems 
and develop this as a regime-wide best practice.  
CubeSat Community 
To the extent that propulsion systems will be compatible 
with the CubeSat specification, community stakeholders 
could consider revising the specification to encourage or 
require protected links with propulsion systems, 
potentially to include expanding General Requirement 
3.1.5.  
Acknowledgments 
Numerous individuals in the smallsat community 
generously shared their time and insights with the 
authors in the development of this paper. While they 
have asked to contribute without specific 
acknowledgement, we appreciate their willingness to 
engage on this topic.  
References  
1. D. Wright, L. Grego, L. Gronlund, “The Physics 
of Space Security”, American Academy of Arts 
and Science, 2005. 
2. D. Galton, “The Challenge of Small Satellite 
Systems to the Space Security Environment”, 
Thesis submitted to the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, 2012.  
3. G. Forden, “Viewpoint: China and Space War”, 
Astropolitics, Vol 6, No. 2, pp. 138–153, 2008. 
4. J. Bouwmeester, J. Guo, “Survey of worldwide 
pico- and nanosatellite missions, distributions and 
subsystem technology”, Acta Astronautica, 
Volume 67, Issues 7–8, October–November 2010, 
Pages 854-862. 
5. Nanosatellite Database by Erik 
http://www.nanosats.eu/ 
6. A. Petro, “Small Spacecraft technology, Markets 
& Motivations”, briefing to the NASA Advisory 
Committee, July 2014. 
7. T. Wekerle et. al., “Status and Trends of Smallsats 
and Their Launch Vehicles - An Up-to-date 
Review”, Journal of Aerospace Technology and 
Management, Vol. 9, no. 3, July/Sept 2017. 
8. B. Oving et. al., “Small Innovative Launcher for 
Europe: achievement of the H2020 project 
SMILE”, 7th European Conference for 
Aeronautics and Space Sciences (EUCASS), 
2017. 
9. Union of Concerned Scientists database, including 
launches through 8/31/2017 
Kurzrok 10 32nd Annual AIAA/USU 
  Conference on Small Satellites 
https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-
weapons/satellite-database#.WuufBIjwaUl 
10. Committee on National Security Systems, 
“Cybersecurity Policy For Space Systems Used 
To Support National Security Missions”, CNSSP-
12, February 2018.  
11. K. Colton, B. Klofas, “Supporting the Flock: 
Building a Ground Station Network for Autonomy 
and Reliability,” 30th Annual AIAA/USU 
Conference on Small Satellites, SSC16-IX-05, 
2016.   
12. E. Sims, B. Braun. “Navigating the Policy 
Compliance Roadmap for Small Satellites,” The 
Aerospace Corporation, November 2017. 
13. B. Braun et. al., “Navigating the Policy 
Compliance Roadmap for Small Satellites,” 30th 
Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small 
Satellites, SSC16-II-06, 2016. 
14. Licensing of Private Remote Sensing Systems, 15 
C.F.R. § 960 2006. 
15. G. Sutton, O. Biblarz, “Rocket Propulsion 
Elements”, Eighth Edition, 2010. 
16. D. Krejci, P. Lozano, “Space Propulsion 
Technology for Small Spacecraft”, IEEE Vol. 106, 
No. 3, March 2018. 
17. K. Lemmer, “Propulsion for CubeSats”, Acta 
Astronautica, Volume 134, May 2017, Pages 231-
243. 
18. V. Zakirov et. al., “Specifics of Small Satellite 
Propulsion: Part 1”, 15th Annual AIAA/USU 
Conference on Small Satellites, 2001. 
19. “NASA State of the Art of Small Spacecraft 
Technology”, Section 4, Last modified March 
2018, https://sst-soa.arc.nasa.gov/04-propulsion 
20. G. Manzoni, Y. L. Brama, “Cubesat 
Micropropulsion Characterization in Low Earth 
Orbit”, 29th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on 
Small Satellites, SSC15-IV-5, 2015. 
21. K. Anflo et. al., “Flight Demonstration of new 
Thruster and Green Propellant Technology on the 
PRISMA Satellite”, 21st Annual AIAA/USU 
Conference on Small Satellites, SSC07-X-2, 2007. 
22. Busek Micro Resistojet Data Sheet, 
http://www.busek.com/index_htm_files/7000851
8B.pdf 
23. Busek BIT-3 RF Ion Thruster Data Sheet 
http://www.busek.com/index_htm_files/7001081
9D.pdf 
24. S. W. Benson et. al., Development of a PPT for the 
EO-1 Spacecraft, 35th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE 
Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibit, AIAA-
99-2276, 2009. 
25. E. Jens et. al., “Design and Testing of a Hybrid 
Rocket Motor to Enable Interplanetary CubeSat 
Missions,” 68th International Astronautical 
Congress, IAC-17-C4.8-B4.5A.7x37024, 2017. 




27. P. Anz-Meador, “A Review of Space Environment 
Implications of CubeSat Traffic, 2003-2014”, 
Orbital Debris Quarterly News, NASA Orbital 
Debris Program Office, Vol. 19, Issue 3, July 
2015.  
28. D. Vallado; “Fundamentals of Astrodynamics and 
Applications”, Microcosm Press, 2013. 
29. J. Longuski, J. Guzman, J. Prussing, “Optimal 
Control with Aerospace Applications”, Springer, 
2014. 
30. F. Bardanis, “Kill vehicle effectiveness for boost 
phase interception of ballistic missiles”; Thesis 
submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, 2004. 
31. L. Wang et. al., “Analysis and Simulation on the 
Intercepting Performance of Exoatmospheric Kill 
Vehicle”, IEEE Asia Simulation Conference - 7th 
Intl. Conf. on Sys. Simulation and Scientific 
Computing, 2008. 
32. O. Montenbruck, S. Rozkov, A. Semenov, et. al.; 
“Orbit Determination and Prediction of the 
International Space Station”; Journal of 
Spacecraft and Rockets; Vol. 48; No. 6; pp. 1955-
1067, November–December 2011. 
33. K. Chan, “Spacecraft Collision Probability”, 
American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, 2008. 
34. S. Alfano, “Relating Position Uncertainty to 
Maximum Conjunction Probability”; AAS/AIAA 
Astrodynamics Specialists Conference; Montana, 
August 2003. 
35. “National Space Traffic Management Policy,” 
Space Policy Directive-3. Presidential 
Memorandum. Issued June 18, 2018. 
